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Abstract This paper aims to explore the quality of economic growth in a sample
of 50 emerging and transition economies (ETEs), which are countries experiencing
a process of fast growth and institutional change. Economic growth during 1995–
2006 is regressed against poverty, inequality and human development variables
using OLS cross-country regression models. The main findings are that growth did
not reduce poverty and income inequality worsened too. On the one hand, economic
growth occurred despite the worsening of income inequality. However, this result
does not identify a ‘‘U-shaped’’ Kuznets curve because even after a consistent
period of growth, inequality did not decrease and it remained at higher levels. Only
countries with higher education levels and public expenditure in strategic dimen-
sions seem to escape from this trap. On the other hand, growth occurred at the
expense of an important human development variable i.e., life expectancy, and of an
important indicator of democracy, i.e., voice and accountability.
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Introduction
World economic growth was well sustained in the last decade, although many
industrialised countries, western European in particular, did not experience fast
growth. Emerging economies (EEs), such as low-to-middle per capita income
economies, and transition economies (TEs), such as former communist countries,
are experiencing a process of fast growth and institutional change in most cases.
This paper aims first of all to explore the social sustainability and the quality of such
growth in those countries. The economic growth that occurred in emerging and
transition economies (ETEs) during the period 1995–2006 was, on average, 4.7%,
and above the average world growth. The paper examines, in particular, whether,
this growth resulted in income distribution, measured as a reduction of the Gini
coefficient, and in a reduction of poverty, measured by a cut-off line of $4 a day.
Secondly, the paper addresses important issues of the economic development
process, such as the dynamics of life expectancy and education, and of human
development variables more generally. In particular the paper tries to understand
whether or not economic growth increased human development in ETEs.
Such an issue is crucial to the identification of a process of economic growth with
a process of economic development. In their widely quoted economic development
book, Perkins et al. (2007) stress the difference between economic growth
(understood as the rate of growth in goods and services produced) and economic
development (which involves economic growth together with change in some
human development variables, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, education,
and other goals such as environment sustainability, political democracy, income
distribution, participation, access to resources, etc.). Cypher and Dietz (2004) also
make such a differentiation between economic growth and (economic) develop-
ment. The latter ‘‘…encompasses a wide range of social and human goals that, while
including the level of income and economic growth, goes well beyond this as well’’
(Cypher and Dietz 2004), p. 29. This differentiation must not be confused with that
discussed among institutional economists1 who perceive economic growth as a
static phenomenon and economic development as a wider perspective of develop-
ment that includes structural and institutional change, social dynamics and cultural
change (Myrdal 1974). However, it has to be said that these two perspectives of
economic development (the one put forward by Perkins et al. (2007) and Cypher
and Dietz (2004), and the other put forward by Myrdal 1974) would easily converge
in the end because, as Myrdal (1974), p. 729 himself states, economic development
would bring about improvements in health, education and other collective goods.
Through a series of cross-country regressions, using OLS models, the paper
assesses the type of development in a sample of 50 ETEs. Economic growth during
1995–2006 is regressed against poverty, inequality and human development
variables. The main findings are that growth did not reduce poverty and that
inequality increased, on average, among ETEs during this period. Moreover,
economic growth occurred at the expense of an important human development
1 Cf. Brinkman (1995) for a review on this perspective.
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variable i.e., life expectancy and an important indicator of political democracy, i.e.,
voice and accountability.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: ‘‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty: a
Brief Review’’ presents an essential review on poverty, inequality and growth;
‘‘Institutional Change and Economic Growth in ETEs’’ analyses more deeply the
institutional change occurring in ETEs, putting forward a model of development
path (Fig. 1)2; ‘‘ETEs: a Description of the Sample’’ describes the sample of ETEs;
‘‘Poverty and Inequality in Transition and Emerging Economies’’ shows the results
of the OLS regression models on poverty and inequality in ETEs; ‘‘Conclusion’’
concludes the paper.
Growth, Inequality and Poverty: a Brief Review
In the terminology of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the World Bank
(WB), economic development is not just about economic growth in general but a
particular kind of economic growth, identified by the words ‘‘high-quality growth’’
(HQG), which both the IMF and the WB claim to promote (IMF 1995). In
particular, IMF defines HQG as ‘‘…growth that is sustainable, brings lasting gains
in employment and living standards and reduce poverty. HQG should promote
greater equity and equality of opportunity. It should respect human freedom and
protect the environment’’; and it should ‘‘…bear the primary responsibility for the
care, nutrition, and education. Achieving HQG depends, therefore, not only on
pursuing sound economic policies, but also on implementing a broad range of social
policies’’ (IMF 1995), p. 286. Hence, great emphasis is put on reduction in levels of
poverty and inequality, together with the pursuit of social goals, such as improved
2 Note: during the first period, from the origin to the point A, the speed of institutional change is faster
than the speed of economic growth. In the second period, from point A to B, the economic growth is









Fig. 1 The Development Path
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health and education, which should increase accordingly during the process of
economic growth.
Poverty and inequality are key concerns nowadays among economists of
development. However, social attitudes towards poverty and inequality can change
through time, basically because tolerance of high levels of poverty and inequality
varies across countries, cultures, and times. Western societies have become less
tolerant against poverty over time; East Asia, mainly following Confucianism, does
not, in general, tolerate high economic inequality. Unfortunately this promising field
of research has not produced many cross-cultural studies. Alexander and Kumaran
(1992) studied culture and development in India. They discovered that the lowest
tolerance of inequality is not in the richest States of India, but in those with the
highest education levels. If it were possible to make some generalization on the
basis of this, one could say that variation in values that concern inequality is
influenced by education. Indeed within both developed and less developed
countries, those which have achieved higher levels of education seem to show
less tolerance towards inequality and poverty (Cypher and Dietz 2004).
Gary Fields (1989) reviewed all the major empirical studies on growth, inequality
and poverty and found out that there is no general predictable relationship between
inequality and GDP growth; the relationship can work in both ways round.
Nevertheless, there seems to be some evidence of poverty reduction associated with
economic growth. However, he did not conclude that economic growth reduces
poverty. It is possible that during GDP expansion the poor become less poor, and
during GDP contraction the poor become even poorer (Dollar and Kraay 2001).
However, eradicating poverty can take generations and it is not only a matter of
economic growth. Moreover, social policies and income distribution are, as will be
shown below, strictly linked to poverty reduction. Hence, as Myrdal (1974) and
many others, such as Pronk (1993) and Street (1987) argue, a holistic approach is
required to defeat poverty. Poverty has a social and political dimension; both should
be addressed in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of the meaning of poverty,
its causes and its consequences. Poverty alleviation comes as a result of a complex
analysis and of the implementation of strategies that bring together both different
disciplines and the poor themselves in the process of policy-making.
Poverty
The World Bank claims the defeat of poverty as its main target, and policies which
‘‘make poverty a dream’’ are now at the core of its agenda. Over time, however, WB
policies on poverty have changed consistently. During the 1960s, the WB believed
that the best way to reduce poverty in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) was a rapid
industrialisation. During the 1970s the WB understood the need to develop the rural
sector in LDCs as a vehicle for both economic growth and poverty reduction. In the
1980s, the WB was more committed to structural adjustment, as the IMF was
implementing structural adjustment programmes in Developed Countries (DC). In
the 1990s the WB embraced a more general approach to combat poverty involving
investments in human capital, macroeconomic adjustment, fostering economic
growth, environment attention, etc. Finally, in the 2000s, the WB and the IMF
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together developed a new approach to poverty reduction, the so called Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). PRSPs set policies and agendas to reduce
poverty and integrate economic, social and environmental issues into a general
framework. They are developed in a participatory way, with the involvement of
individuals, NGOs, international organisations, local and national authorities
(Marcus and Wilkinson 2002).
So far the aim of defeating world poverty has not been achieved; from the
analysis in this paper it has emerged that growth did not contribute to poverty
reduction between 1995 and 2006. Most of the criticism directed at the WB and the
IMF lies in the fact that the approach they adopted towards LDCs during the 1980s
and the 1990s relied exclusively on structural adjustment and economic growth,
transplanting policies and institutions from developed countries. The World Bank
(2000) estimates that poverty, measured with a cut-off line of poverty of $1 a day,
increased from 1,116 million to 1,200 million people from 1985 to 1998. With a cut-
off line of $2 a day, people falling within the poverty trap form nearly half of the
global population (2.8 billion).3 In terms of percentages, while poverty is stable in
Sub-Saharan Africa (46.3% of population) and in Latin America and the Caribbean
(15.6% of population), it fell in the Middle East and North Africa (from 4.3 to
1.9%), in Southern Asia (from 44.4 to 40%) and in particular in Eastern Asia (from
26.6 to 15.3%).
In Sub-Saharan Africa and in many other LDCs the main problem causing
poverty seems to be deprivation of basic human necessities such as food, basic
medicines, water, illiteracy etc. (Cypher and Dietz 2004). In richer countries, such
as ETEs with low-to-middle per capita income, the main problem causing poverty
seems to be also deprivation (Sen 1999); however, different forms of deprivation are
prevalent here, such as education, nourishment, health, employment etc. Such
deprivations, in both groups of countries, do not allow people to develop their
capabilities and to achieve liberation from poverty.4 In many cases, these
deprivations do not depend on money, but a cut-off line of poverty of $1 or $4 a
day can be considered just as a proxy for such a problem.
In addition, when poverty is measured through the concept of ‘‘poverty gap’’,5
the strong link between poverty and distribution immediately becomes clear. In fact,
the poverty gap appears to be relatively modest in size when compared to current
income in LDCs. Theoretically, the poverty gap can be interpreted as the amount of
income that must be created and received by the poor in order to bring income
above the poverty line (Cypher and Dietz 2004), p. 7. For instance the poverty gap,
3 Cf. World Bank (2000:3 and 13).
4 On this concept is drawn the Human Poverty Index (HPI), a composite index which measures
deprivations in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index: a long and healthy
life (health), knowledge (education) and a decent standard of living (income) (UNDP, 2006).
5 The poverty gap is the percentage by which the income of the poor falls short of the poverty line,
measured usually as a percentage of total consumption of the country. In other terms, it is the amount of
additional income needed to raise all the poor above the poverty line. This measure would help towards a
better understanding of the severity of the poverty. For instance, if a country has half of its population in
poverty but each person is only $2 away, per year, from the poverty level, it is in a better position than a
country with half of its population in poverty but each person is $50 away, per year, from the poverty
level.
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in the 1990s, was around 10–12% in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia and
around 2% in the rest of LDCs (World Bank 1990). These figures underline that in
the final analysis eradicating poverty is a political economy matter and not a
technical one. However, it has to be added that distribution alone would not be
enough for a permanent poverty reduction; a process of development would have to
reproduce basic need satisfactions, goods and jobs.
Inequality
The very foundation of the problem of inequality is the concept of social welfare.
According to the utilitarian approach, social welfare is the sum of individual
welfare. Social welfare improvements are not possible (or would not be ‘‘Pareto
efficient’’) by re-distributing resources from one individual to another, because a
‘‘Pareto’’ improvement is only a situation in which it is possible to make someone
better off, without making someone else worse off. On the other hand, an egalitarian
approach would consider re-distribution of resources to avoid the situation where an
individual could become richer by taking advantage of the fact that the other is in
poor health or in poor education, or is handicapped (Sen 1973). In this latter
approach, the application of the Rawls criterion would be the best policy; the aim is
not individual welfare but the level of welfare in the society. If one individual (A)
has a lower level of welfare that another (B), and if B can be made better off by re-
distributing resources from A, then the Rawls criterion of justice requires that B
should have sufficiently more income to make B’s utility equal to A’s. In Rawlsian
thinking, inequalities have to be adjusted following two principles: (1) offices and
positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
(2) they have to be of greatest benefits for the least-advantaged members of the
society (Rawls 1971), p. 303. To be applied, these criteria require more than
meritocracy. ‘Fair equality of opportunity’ requires not only that positions are
distributed on the basis of merit, but also that all have equal opportunity, in terms of
education, health etc., to acquire those skills on the basis of which merit is assessed.
The application of these principles would, in the end, produce much greater
advantages for the society as a whole.
Another way to look at the problem of inequality is through social peace and
cohesion. Sen (1973) saw inequality as strictly linked to the concept of rebellion and
indeed the two phenomena are linked in both ways. Inequality causes rebellion, but
it may happen that income inequality may increase after a rebellion where it brings
power to a specific apparatus or a nomenclature or a social class; this has happened
many times in history when, for instance, rebellions were led by army generals or by
elites of nobles. In several transition economies, inequality increased after a
‘‘rebellion’’ which brought to power oligarchs. In particular, in the former Soviet
Union inequality increased dramatically after the 1991 August Coup which deposed
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev and dissolved the URSS. In some African
countries, such as Congo, Sudan etc. the same happened: rebellions, carried out by
generals and warlords, deposed previous authoritarian or less authoritarian regimes,
but such a change brought about an increase in inequality. Nowadays, economists
try to capture a causality nexus (inequality ? rebellion ? inequality) through the
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use of some modern governance indicators such as political stability. The link
between political stability and inequality is demonstrated in numerous empirical
works such as Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Easterly (2001), where it emerges that
income inequality increases during political instability.
An interesting explanation of inequality in the Americas is put forward by
Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), who, in order to explain inequality in wealth,
human capital and political power, suggest an institutional explanation, historically
founded, which lies in the initial roots of the factors of endowment of the respective
colonies. In general, political institutions set up by the Spaniards and Portuguese in
Latin America were different from the ones set up by the British in North America.
Moreover, the latter sent educated people and skilled work forces, along with
the lords, to the New World, and these started to build their own future; while the
Spaniards and the Portuguese did not encourage massive migration from the
motherland, but sent landlords who basically exploited slaves from Africa.
One of the first cross-country works on inequality was made by Kuznets (1955).
He showed that in the early stage of economic growth income tends to be unequally
distributed among individuals. In the early stage of a growth process, over time, the
distribution of income worsens. In the later stages, national income starts to be more
equally distributed. Hence, inequality declines in the end, after the country has
accomplished the ‘‘U’’-shaped trajectory. Several later empirical studies confirmed
this relationship (Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Ahluwalia 1976). The reason for such
a relationship was attributed to structural changes, which at the beginning of the
‘‘transition’’ bring about job losses and inequalities.
Nevertheless, the implicit trade-off behind the Kuznets curve (economic growth/
inequality) and the idea that an increase in inequality is sometimes necessary for a
rapid growth has been often criticized (Atkinson 1999). An alterative hypothesis to
explain why income inequality differs among countries is put forward by Milanovic
(1994), who shows that inequality decreases in richer societies because social
attitudes towards inequality change as those societies get richer, and inequality is
less tolerated. Birdsall and Sabot (1994) showed, contrary to the Kuznets
hypothesis, that inequality may be a constraint for growth and, if inequality is
lowered, then a country could have a GDP per capita 8.2% higher than a country
with income inequality 1 standard deviation higher.
A similar hypothesis is suggested by Voitchovsky (2005), p. 273 who, however,
stresses the shape of the distribution and suggests that inequality at the top end of
the distribution is positively associated with growth, while inequality lower down
the distribution is negatively related to subsequent growth. Moreover, empirical
evidence in cross-country analysis, from Latin American to East Asian Countries,
would pose the question why Latin America has high inequality and low growth
and, on the contrary, why East Asia has high growth and low inequality. Birdsall
and Sabot (1994) suggest that it is a matter of policies and social attitude towards
inequality. In Latin America, dictators, generals and the ruling classes acted, for a
long time after WWII, with little respect for the poorest part of their society,
implementing fiscal and trade policies that provided few benefits to the poor. On the
contrary, in East Asia the ruling classes were more aware of social needs, and
implemented policies such as land reforms, public housing, public investments in
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rural infrastructures and public education which had a positive effect on both growth
and income distribution; better educated people can get a better job and earn more;
public investment in the rural sector can bring farmer productivity and income
higher; public housing and other social services can increase the purchasing power
of people, and so forth.
Institutional Change and Economic Growth in ETEs
Emerging and transition economies are countries which are experiencing a huge
process of institutional change, involving both a social and cultural transformation
and a political and economic reform (Kornai 2006; Mauro 2000).6 However, in
order to be socially sustainable and macro-economically stable, the incumbent
process of institutional change in ETEs has to be consistent: the change occurring in
the formal sphere of the institutional framework (which involves laws, organization
and state institutions) should move coherently with that in informal institutions i.e.,
with social rules and uncodified laws and values, which prescribe certain behaviours
and affect in several ways the economic behaviour of agents and their choices
(Hodgson 2006; Nugent and Lin 1995). Moreover, and most importantly, the change
has to guarantee equal gains to people who otherwise would resist the transfor-
mation. Inertia towards a new institutional framework occurs when the social
benefits of transformation are not universal and where many people, during the
transformation, become losers in terms of unemployment, purchasing power,
education, etc. (Tridico 2006). Therefore the change should be radical and should
involve as well relationships between the various powers, and lobbies (Mabogunje
1989) which are able to change political institutions.
My assumption, concerning political institutions, is that a country which is
governed more democratically and where political institutions are oriented towards
freedom guarantees, people participation and political rights, is a country where
citizens can have some power and can make some lobbying on the governors.
Consequently public decisions, in this country, would be more oriented towards
collective benefits than a country where the level of democracy and freedom is less
marked. The country which enjoys better democracy, freedom and political rights
would extend people opportunities more easily than a country where these rights are
restricted. Such a restriction would cause lower level of human development and
lower economic growth.
Following this approach, development might be defined as a process that
involves economic growth and institutional change (Toye 1995). As Kuznets
(1965), p. 30 put it in referring to developing countries: ‘‘the transformation of an
underdeveloped into a developed country is not merely the mechanical addition of a
stock of physical capital: it is a thoroughgoing revolution in the patterns of life and a
cardinal change in the relative powers and positions of various groups in the
6 The term ‘‘emerging economy’’ was coined in 1981 by Antoine Van Agtmael of the World Bank, and
refers to countries that are ‘‘emerging’’ from under-development, and are restructuring their economies
along market-oriented lines. Cf. Agtmael (2007). Transition economies refer strictly to former communist
countries which are transforming their economies from a planned system to market economies.
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population’’. The process of institutional change has to guarantee two important
factors: first, a breaking with previous institutions, routines and norms and
overcoming ‘‘…the resistance of a whole complex of established interests and
values’’ that previously impeded economic growth (Kuznets 1965), p. 30. Secondly,
it has to guarantee the distribution of growth and of the social benefits of
development. It is crucial therefore to know how to change institutions and how to
enforce a new institutional deal which will bring about economic development i.e.
improving both living condition, in terms of income and distribution, and quality of
life, in terms of health and education. Hence, institutional policies and an active role
of the State are needed during such a transformation in order to guarantee a stable
and sustainable economic development.
Such a definition of change, strictly connected with the process of economic
development, can be summarised by a graph where, on the vertical axis there is the
level of institutional change, which involves social, cultural and political change; on
the horizontal axis there is the speed of economic growth. These two variables,
institutional change and economic growth, identify the path of the development
process which, if the speed of change of the two variables is appropriate and
consistent, will be positively inclined, as shown approximately in Fig. 1.
This path of development is the one that many current industrialised countries
experienced after WWII. In these countries, economic growth, together with a
process of institutional change in the system of values, the culture and the society,
brought about economic development also, in the sense that poverty was defeated or
substantially reduced, inequality was reduced, political democracy was achieved
and human development improved, because social policies were implemented and
simultaneously an important Welfare State was created. Will ETEs replicate such a
development path? I maintain that the type of development will not necessarily be
the same, in the sense that institutions and strategies for development can be
different. Informal institutions are also different. However, insofar as the specific
country strategy includes an appropriate institutional change with consistent social
institutions, accompanied by economic growth, the trend of the path could be
replicated, although with different policy prescriptions.
Given the concept of institutions as including both formal and informal
institutions, changing formal institutions alone in order to achieve another system is
no longer sufficient. More important is to ‘‘change the mentality’’ of economic
agents. Both prevalent rules and the mentality of agents can be considered in
Veblen’s sense of shared ‘‘habits of thought’’ (Veblen 1919), p. 273. If the formal
economic institutions are neglected, informal institutions and processes of
spontaneous forces prevail. These forces fill the power vacuum of the system.
Consequently, the transformation would favour better organised groups, elites, the
better educated and the groups in a dominant position. Simultaneously, it would
cause disadvantages to less organised groups, unskilled workers, the poor and the
less well educated.
As a consequence, economic growth, if it occurs, will not be distributed,
inequality will rise and poverty will not be defeated. Development would therefore
be uneven, opportunities and capabilities for many people would decrease, and
there would be many more losers than winners. Moreover, this informal
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institutionalisation may also be parastatal or illegal. Hence, such uncontrolled
transformation strongly favours the emergence of organised crime, corrupt
bureaucracy, informal economies, negative informal economic networks, rent-
seeking, illegal lobbies and so forth.
ETEs: a Description of the Sample
Most of the reputable studies on the dynamics of poverty, inequality and growth,
focus more on LDCs and less on ETEs. This is mainly because emerging and
transition economics is a relatively new field of research, and a good assessment on
the relationship between poverty, inequality and growth would need quite a long
time span, 10–15 years minimum. Secondly, all transition economies experienced a
huge recession at the beginning of the 1990s, hence economic growth started in
many countries in the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, most of the studies on
poverty and inequality in transition economies, focus on the worsening of these two
variables during the recession period (Atkinson and Miklewright 1992; Milanovic
1995, 1998; Gradstein and Milanovic 2004), and not really on their evolution during
a process of growth acceleration.
This paper tries to fill this hole and examines, empirically, poverty, inequality
and growth in a wide sample of ETEs. This group consists of two elements:
Emerging Economies (EEs) as defined by the World Bank and the IMF i.e.,
countries with low-to-middle per capita income in a process of institutional reforms
and integration in the world economy (IMF 2001; World Bank 1998); and transition
economies, i.e., former communist countries such as current members of the
Confederation of Independent States (CIS) and Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs). Of course Emerging Economies and Transition Economies are
very different from each other, from many different points of view, historically,
socially and economically. However, they are often considered, by international
financial organisations such as Morgan Stanley, Grant Thornton, Goldman Sachs
and The Economist group, as part of the group of Emerging Economies, broadly
speaking, in the sense that they are experiencing a process of reform and of
institutional change. Nevertheless, I would say that although Transition Economies
can be considered, in some ways, as Emerging Economies, the opposite is not true.
Transition economics is a very specific concept that was applied to former
communist countries which, after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, began transition from a planned to a market
economy. In general, most of these countries were already industrialised and middle
per capita income economies. Taking the beginning of the 1990s as a starting point,
most of them had better initial conditions than the Emerging economies, in terms of
both infrastructure and quality of life (captured by life expectancy, poverty levels,
infant mortality, education, etc.).
Emerging economies can be small, medium and large, and, in general, they
appear on the global scene because they are becoming more open, in terms of
trade and flows of foreign investments. Brazil, China and Tunisia, for instance, are
part of the category of emerging economies because they have been experiencing
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a process of reform over the past decade, with openness, economic growth,
institutional and structural change. By this definition, some European countries,
such as Spain and Ireland, could have been considered as emerging economies in
the 1980s and 1990s when they experienced fast growth and structural change. For
this reason I include them in this analysis as reference countries for current
emerging economies.
However, since the aim of this paper is to look at the effects of economic
growth on income distribution and poverty I selected, from among ETEs, a group
of 48 countries that experienced a growth acceleration process in the last 11 years
(1995–2006). A growth acceleration is defined by Rodrik et al. (2005) p. 305 as
an increase in per-capita growth of 2 percentage points or more for at least
8 years.7 In this way I included only the ETEs that grew at an average rate of
more than 2% in the period 1995–2006.8 Moreover, I started the cross-section
analysis from 1995 because many transition economies experienced a huge
recession at the beginning of the 1990s.
Average growth in these countries during 1995–2006 was 4.71%; this was
above the world average growth of 4.33% (IMF 2007). At the same time, the
average income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, grew in the same
period (1993–2004), reaching an average level of 39%; the average of Gini
variation was ?7%; poverty, on average, decreased from 52 to 42%, as measured
by a cut-off line of $4. However, the average of poverty variation was ?20%,
showing that many countries experienced a huge increased in the poverty level
between 1993 and 2004.9 Hence, when assessing the quality of economic
development also inequality and poverty dynamics need to be addressed, as it will
be done below.
Poverty and Inequality in Transition and Emerging Economies
This section deals with the specific path of development in ETEs. Firstly, I analyse
whether ETEs experienced, together with a growth acceleration process, a reduction
of poverty, an increase of political democracy, and an improvement of the human
development variables. The second part of this section will focus on income
distribution. In other words I will explore whether those countries experienced
development or just economic growth.
7 Rodrik et al. (2005:305).
8 The complete list of countries considered in our sample include the following: Albania, Algeria,
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia TFYR, Malaysia, Mexico,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet
Nam. These are 23 transition economies (former communist countries), 25 non former communist
emerging economies and 2 old European Union member States (Spain and Ireland), included in the
sample as reference countries for current emerging economies.
9 Table 2 explains this apparent contradiction.
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Poverty
In order to answer to this question I used the sample of 50 ETEs described above. In
the first regression below I found that economic growth in 1995–2006 was
associated with more poverty, less democracy, as underlined by the coefficient voice
and accountability, more authoritarianism, as underlined by the coefficient
government effectiveness, and with negative variation of life expectancy during
the period 1995–2004.
In the regression Table 1, it is surprising to see how well the observed variables
fit with economic growth. In particular, an initial high level of poverty in 1993, an
increasing level of poverty (1993–2004), a negative value of the indicator voice and
accountability between 1998 and 2005 (a proxy for democracy and pluralism), a
positive value of the indicator Government Effectiveness10 and a negative variation
of life expectancy from 1995 to 2004, despite an initial higher level of the latter, are
Table 1 Economic growth in ETEs
OLS model–Obs 50 dependent variable: economic growth 1995–2006
Variables Coefficient
Poverty (1993) 0.060977* (0.012766)
Poverty variation (1993–2004) 0.008892* (0.002588)
Voice and accountability (1998–2005) -0.830378** (0.394578)
Government effectiveness (1998–2005) 1.499615** (0.467849)
Life expectancy growth (1995–2004) -0.165477** (0.051299)






Mean dependent var 4.752131
Prob (F statistic) 0.000055
Standard Errors (in parenthesis) are heteroschedasticity–robust after White test. Multicollinearity not
relevant
Source: own elaboration on Heston et al. (2006), UNDP (2006) data and Kaufmann et al. (2006)
* Significance level at 1%
** Significance level at 5%
10 Both voice and accountability and Government Effectiveness are World Bank indicators of
Governance. World Bank indicators, elaborated by Kaufmann et al. (2008) reflect the statistical
compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents in developed, transition and developing countries, as reported by a number of
survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations. Indexes
are estimated between -2.5 and ?2.5. They concern five fundamental governance dimensions: voice and
accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and




all functions of the economic growth that occurred during 1995–2006. The values of
these variables do not identify a process of development of quality. Growth
occurred at the expense of fundamental development variables such as life
expectancy, poverty, and voice and accountability. The fact that an initial higher
level of life expectancy, in 1995, is also functional to economic growth does not
contradict the results; it just underlines that life expectancy, initially higher,
declined during the process of economic growth (Table 2).
By contrast, a process of development of quality, High Quality Growth, is
brought about when there is an improvement in human development variables,
causing an increasing of the Human Development Index (HDI); this is an alternative
means of measuring well being to GDP per capita (UNDP 1990). The UNDP
Human Development Index is a composite index, ranking between 0 and 1. It is the
combination of two non-income dimensions of people’s lives and one income
dimension. The first one is life expectancy at birth which also reflects infant
mortality; the second is educational attainment which is a combination of primary,
secondary and tertiary educational levels and adult literacy rate. The third element is
an adjusted GDP index which reflects income per capita measured in Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) at US$ (UNDP 1990). In fact, the idea that the GDP is an
absolute and reliable measure of development has been widely criticized by
development economists (Morris 1979; Sen 1985; Noorbakhsh 1996). A great deal
of empirical evidence shows that, both in developing and in developed economies,
some countries have relatively high GDP per capita but very low indicators of
development such as literacy, access to drinking water, rate of infant mortality, life
expectancy, education, etc. This is partly due to the fact that wealth is unequally
distributed. Conversely, there are cases of relatively low GDP per capita and high
indicators of development in countries where income is more equally distributed
(Ray 1998).11
The HDI is determined, in the following regression, by voice and accountability
and low poverty. In the sample, countries having a lower poverty level (2004) and
higher voice and accountability 1998–2004 also have a higher HDI 2004—which is
indeed different from having a higher GDP per capita.
The results of the regression in Table 3, which is in a sense the reverse of the
regression in Table 1, confirm my hypothesis. Among ETEs, countries with a higher
level of development—represented here by the index HDI—would have lower
11 For instance, Guatemala has a GDP per capita that is higher than Sri Lanka but inequality is much
higher in Guatemala. Development indicators are much better in Sri Lanka than in Guatemala. Life
expectancy (years): 72 compared with 65; infant mortality rate (per 1000): 18 compared with 48; access
to safe water (% of pop.): 60 compared with 62; adult literacy rate (%): 89 compared with 54 (UNDP,
1995). Examples like this are numerous and non-perfect correspondence between GDP and development
indicators can be observed even in industrialized countries where there are more resources to distribute.
For instance, Ireland has the highest GDP per capita after Luxemburg yet its non-income dimension
indicators i.e., education and life expectancy are lower than Italy or Portugal (UNDP 2006). Saudi Arabia
has a GDP per capita which is higher than many transition economies such as Poland Czech Republic,
Hungary etc., but its non-income dimension indicators are lower. The US has an income per capita which
is much higher than most of the countries in the world, yet life expectancy of black American citizens is
lower than in China or in the Indian State of Kerala. As a result of all these contradictions and exceptions,
the UNDP taxation of Human Development Indexes and GDP rank is not at all coincident (UNDP 1999).











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































poverty and higher political democracy, represented by the index voice and
accountability (Table 4).
Interestingly enough, poverty appears to be reduced by three variables: public
expenditure in education, public expenditure in health, and political stability (see
Table 5). Political stability is an important indicator, which in general is a
consequence of cohesion and social peace; in this circumstance, it is most likely that
appropriate poverty reduction policies have been implemented. Conversely,
economic growth (1995–2006) did not contribute to poverty reduction as the
coefficient for the variable economic growth (1995–2006) is not significant (see II
regression). A predictable model which would represent poverty reduction and
which is in fact confirmed by the result below is the following:






(min -2.5 max ?2.5)
Government effectiveness
average 1998–2004
(min -2.5 max ?2.5)
All countries 0.788 -0.06 0.02
CIS (12 countries) 0.746 -0.9 -0.7
CEECs (11 countries) 0.848 0.7 0.5
Latin American (8 countries) 0.792 0.2 -0.2
Asia (9 countries) 0.699 -0.7 -0.1
Africa, Middle East and Turkey
(8 countries)
0.733 -0.3 0.0
EU–2 old MS 0.947 1.2 1.5
Source: own elaboration on UNDP (2006) data and Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Table 3 HDI in ETEs
OLS model–Obs 50 dependent variable: Human Development Index 2004
Variables Coefficients
Voice and accountability 1998–2005 0.026915* (0.009763)






Mean dependent var 0.786104
Prob (F statistic) 0.000000
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroschedasticity–robust after White test. Multicollinearity not
relevant
Source: own elaboration on UNDP (2006) and World Bank (2007) data
* Significance level at 1%
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Poverty ¼ a b1  Edu b2  Health  b3Pol:Stab þ e
In other words poverty increases when public expenditure in education and in
health decreases and when political troubles and political instability increases.
A theoretical explanation of this evidence can be traced back to Amartya Sen’s
thought. Since public expenditure in education and health would improve education
level and life expectancy, crucial indicators of development, poverty will be
reduced because individual capabilities of doing and being will increase (Sen 1999).
Another way of seeing the relation represented in Table 6 is to regress Poverty
(2004) with infant mortality reduction (1975–1995) (a good proxy also for health
public expenditure), and adult literacy variation (1990/1995) (a good proxy also for
education expenditure). Similarly, economic growth (1995–2006) does not appear
to be significant in this regression. Basically, the evidence which emerges from this
exercise is that poverty is lowered by infant mortality reduction (1970–1995) that
occurred previously to the current economic growth. The variable Adult literacy in
1990/1995 is also significant, in the sense that an initial higher level of education
would cause a lower level of poverty (Table 7).
Table 5 Poverty in ETEs (1)
OLS model–Obs 50 dependent variable: poverty 2004
I Regression II Regression





















Constant 95.83431* (9.177251) Constant 98.75598 (12.88641)
R2 0.6512 R2 0.6514
Adjusted R2 0.6274 Adjusted R2 0.6189
Log likelihood -163.7369 Log likelihood -163.6755
Durbin–Watson stat 1.985574 Durbin–Watson stat 1.966940
Mean dependent var 42.51769 Mean dependent var 42.51769
Prob (F statistic) 0.000000 Prob (F statistic) 0.000001
Standard Errors (in parenthesis) are heteroschedasticity–robust after White test. Multicollinearity not
relevant
Source: own elaboration on Heston et al. (2006), UNDP (2006) and World Bank (2007) data, Kaufmann
et al. (2006)
* Significance level at 1%
** Significance level at 5%
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Hence, it can be concluded from these regression results in Tables 5 and 6 that
economic growth occurred during the last decade did not contribute to a reduction in
poverty or to an increase in human development variables. On the contrary poverty
appears to be much lower in countries enjoying higher levels of political stability,
and which improved human development variables such as infant mortality and
adult literacy during the period before the current economic growth, and thanks to
public investments in the health system and in education (Table 8).










All countries -0.04 3.3 4.5
CIS (12 countries) -0.7 2.3 5.8
CEECs (11 countries) 0.4 5.1 5.3
Latin American (8 countries) 0.1 3.0 3.2
Asia (9 countries) -0.1 1.5 3.1
Africa, Middle East and Turkey
(8 countries)
-0.5 3.6 5.2
EU – 2 old MS 0.8 5.7 4.7
Source: own elaboration on UNDP (2006) data and Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Table 7 Poverty in ETEs (2)
OLS model–Obs 50 dependent variable: poverty 2004
Regression I Regression II
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient
Infant mortality
reduction 1970–1995











Constant 170.3155* (20.2291) Constant 159.3541* (22.15867)
R2 0.5078 R2 0.5231
Adjusted R2 0.4860 Adjusted R2 0.4906
Log likelihood -211.2259 Log likelihood -210.92220
Durbin–Watson stat 2.149447 Durbin–Watson stat 2.181335
Mean dependent var 42.38229 Mean dependent var 42.38229
Prob (F statistic) 0.000001 Prob (F statistic) 0.000005
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroschedasticity–robust after White test. Multicollinearity not
relevant
Source: own elaboration on Heston et al. (2006), UNDP (2006) data and Kaufmann et al. (2006)
* Significance level at 1%
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Inequality
During the last 10–15 years ETEs experienced an increasing trend in the Gini
coefficient. In the sample of ETEs, the average of Gini, in 1993, was 37%, while in
2004 it was above 39%. The average of Gini variation for the same period was
?7%. The lowest values of Gini are in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (25.8%),
Hungary (27%) and Slovenia (28%), among former communist countries, and in
South Korea (31%) for non communist countries. The highest values are in
Botswana (61%), Bolivia (60%), South Africa, Chile and Brazil (57%) and, for
former communist countries, in Russia (42%) (Table 9).
Hence, although economic growth occurred for a quite long period (1995–2006),
inequality did not decrease as predicted by a hypothetical inverted ‘‘U’’-shaped
Kuznets curve. The following figure invalidates such a hypothesis, scattering ETEs
in two periods, in the 1990s and in the 2000s, with GDP per capita on the horizontal
axis and Gini on the vertical axis (Fig. 2).
Why did income inequality increase? I assume because education and other
human development variables (such as life expectancy) worsened. Consecutively,
income distribution worsened. A theoretical model which would represent such a
prediction would be the following:
Gini ¼ a b1  literacy b2  lifeExpe  b3  PubExpe þ e
In order to test such a hypothesis I used an OLS regression model in the usual
sample of 50 ETEs. The results are very interesting, although are a bit more
complex than the model above, as shown in Table 10. The Gini coefficient in 2004
is negatively correlated with Adult literacy in 2004, Adult literacy growth (1995–
2004), Public expenditure (2000–2005) and life expectancy growth eventually
occurring before the current economic growth (1970–1995). Economic growth
(1995–2006), which would increase income inequality in this model by a coefficient
of b = 0.2410, is not statistically significant (cf. Regression II).
Education and public expenditure are crucial variables in this model for a
reduction of income inequality. Public expenditure finances, among other, a national
health system with positive advantages for life expectancy, which should grow too
in order to reduce income inequality. Life expectancy grew consistently before the




mortality 1970–1995 (in %)
All countries 90 55.4
CIS (12 countries) 99 30.7
CEECs (11 countries) 97 56.7
Latin American (8 countries) 90 62.3
Asia (9 countries) 75 52.5
Africa, Middle East and Turkey (8 countries) 74 70.2
EU–2 old MS 98 73.9
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current economic growth in most of the ETEs as shown in Table 9. However, during
1995–2004, life expectancy worsened in many countries (cf. Table 2). This is the
reason why the variables life expectancy variation between 1995 and 2004 and life
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GDP06
Fig. 2 a Gini 1993 versus GDP per capita 1995. b Gini 2004 versus GDP per capita 2006. Source: own
elaboration on World Bank (2007) data
Table 10 Income inequality
OLS model–Obs 50 dependent variable: GINI 2004
Regression I Regression II
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient
Adult literacy 2004 -1.05157* (0.151033) Adult literacy 2004 -1.065728* (0.155722)
Adult literacy growth
(1995–2004)



















Growth (1995–2006) 0.241014 (0.5423469)
Constant 76.94141* (5.969043) Constant 76.32705* (6.180829)
R2 0.5599 R2 0.5619
Adjusted R2 0.5199 Adjusted R2 0.5110
Log likelihood -174.6677 Log likelihood -174.5815
Durbin–Watson stat 1.940153 Durbin–Watson stat 1.952846
Mean dependent var 39.24 Mean dependent var 39.24
Prob (F statistic) 0.0000 Prob (F statistic) 0.0000
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroschedasticity–robust after White test. Multicollinearity not
relevant
Source: own elaboration on Heston et al. (2006), UNDP (2006) and World Bank (2007) data
* Significance level at 1%
** Significance level at 2%
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therefore excluded from the regression in Table 10. In fact, following a capability
approach, basic dimensions such as health and education should be guaranteed by
public policies in order for people to live a long and healthy life, become
knowledgeable and acquire a decent standard of living. If these basic capabilities are
not achieved, many choices are simply not available and many opportunities remain
inaccessible (UNDP 1999). Lack of opportunities will lead to income inequality and
poverty. Very simply, if education is subject only to market rules, then higher
education will be available only to children whose parents can pay market prices.
Poorer parents, who in most of cases are unskilled workers, could not afford such a
cost; consequently unskilled parents will tend to have unskilled children. In this
way, inequality will be ‘‘crystallized’’ within the initial conditions and will not be
reduced during economic growth. Moreover, if growth requires more and more
skilled workers, inequality will increase accordingly.
It seems that economic growth in ETEs requires higher education and ignores
basic education. This is confirmed by the increase, in all the emerging economies, of
exports in the ICT sector (Unctad 2006), which of course has a high employment
ratio of skilled workers. This is likely to be one of the elements of the growing
inequality in ETEs. Unskilled workers, i.e., people with basic education, remain
outside the socio-economic model of growth in ETEs, which includes skilled people
with high education. Such a model produces education inequality and consecutively
income inequality, with an increasing level of people at risk of poverty.
Conclusion
Using ETEs during the period 1995–2006, this paper analyses the process of
development perceived as a wider process of economic growth and of institutional
change bringing about poverty reduction and income distribution alongside an
improvement in human development variables. During this period, ETEs experi-
enced an acceleration growth in the sense of Rodrik et al. (2005), with average
growth equal to 4.7%, and above the world average growth. However, such a
growth did not bring about a process of development as above defined. The results
suggest that the economic growth occurring during the last decade contributed
neither to a decrease in poverty between 1993 and 2004, measured through a cut-off
line of $4 a day, nor to an increase in human development variables, particularly in
life expectancy. On the contrary, these variables worsened, as did voice and
accountability, the proxy for political democracy and pluralism.
Income inequality, measured as a reduction of Gini coefficient between the years
1993 and 2004, worsened too. One can say that growth in ETEs occurred despite the
worsening of income inequality. Nevertheless, this does not identify a ‘‘U-shaped’’
Kuznets curve because a subsequent inequality reduction, after a long period of
growth (11 years) was not observed. On the contrary, inequality increased
constantly. The results suggest also that countries with a lower level of adult
literacy and public expenditure, suffer higher income inequality. Hence, inequality
is not inevitable during economic growth but higher education and State
intervention in strategic dimensions of human development may reduce inequalities;
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a more educated population and an active role of the state in creating equal
opportunities increase individual capabilities with consequent positive effects on
individuals’ income.
In the same way poverty appears to be much lower when countries improved,
during the period before the current economic growth, and thanks to public
investments, human development variables such as infant mortality and adult
literacy. Hence, the holistic role of the State, in the sense of Myrdal (1974) is crucial
in reducing poverty. In fact, as the regression results suggest, the public expenditure
in education and health increases skills and life expectancy, and provides great
opportunities, essential for escaping the poverty trap, and for people to build
creative and long lives. On the contrary, lack of opportunities will lead to both
income inequality and poverty.
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